With a snap parliamentary election set for 30 September, Ukraine faces two of its biggest tests since independence. Will the country be able to conduct a free and fair election? Will it be able to form a government quickly in the days following the poll?
Optimism is not running high internationally regarding Ukraine’s current ability to do either. In private, diplomats and representatives of international organisations worry that many of the same mistakes made in the past will be repeated over the next several months. If they are, Ukraine faces the possibility of continuing the delay in joining the WTO, further difficulties in its co-operation with NATO and the potential derailment of a new EU-Ukraine treaty currently under negotiation.
Last week, EU External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner was clear. “It is important that the elections which will take place on September 30...will indeed be conducted in a fully democratic manner in accordance with international standards,” she said, also expressing hope that “there will be a stable situation in Ukraine which can then be followed by comprehensive reforms on the constitution and reform of the judiciary.”
The response of Foreign Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk was equally clear. “We realise that democratic elections are somehow interlinked with Ukraine-EU bilaterals,” he said. “So, I promise [that the elections will be fair].” President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych also pledged that the elections will meet or exceed European standards.
Despite these statements, little action has been taken to ensure that Ukraine lives up to this commitment. Of particular concern is the lack of legislation ensuring freedom of the press and the prevalence of inaccurate voter lists.
Media pressure
The election campaign will not begin officially until August, but already the major parties are airing television advertisements and increasing their use of “free media.” Because Ukraine has passed no clear laws protecting media outlets or journalists from political and economic pressure, access to media could be one of the most rancorous issues over the next two months.
According to several international human rights watchdogs, including Freedom House, Ukraine has seen a small but significant reversal in media freedoms won during the Orange Revolution protests of 2004. The Ukrainian Institute of Mass Information has documented dozens of cases of pressure on journalists, particularly in the regions outside the capital, during 2006 and early 2007. Its list of “Ukraine’s Enemies of the Press” includes several national politicians who allegedly physically attacked, verbally berated or brought about the dismissal of journalists. No action has been taken against any of these officials, all of whom deny the allegations.
Both Prime Minister Yanukovych and President Yushchenko have said they are committed to non-interference with the press during the upcoming campaign. EU and other Western officials will be watching closely whether the actions of the authorities match these statements. They will also be watching the actions of media owners who may attempt to inappropriately pressure journalists in favour of one political party or another.
Potential for voter list fraud
The respected Committee of Voters of Ukraine recently expressed concern that a political agreement between the prime minister and the president to create a national voter registry is not being fulfilled. The lack of a national, confirmed registry means that local voter rolls may contain thousands of “dead souls,” duplicates and misspellings. Also, individual election precincts control which voters are or are not on the list – and therefore who is or is not allowed to vote.
The voter lists were first identified as a problem by all accredited election monitoring organisations following the 2004 presidential election. Election monitors reported that hundreds of voters were removed from lists in certain precincts, thereby eliminating their opportunity to cast a ballot, while hundreds of others were suddenly added to lists with no identification. Moreover, the addition of names – which were often duplicates – in many precincts on election-day resulted in an official 102-105% turnout in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions.
This problem was temporarily solved during the 2006 parliamentary elections, when Yushchenko fired a number of officials and announced that any local election worker found to have manipulated the vote would be subject to criminal charges. But new constitutional amendments limit Yushchenko’s influence over the Justice Ministry and domestic security services, effectively blunting his ability to police the conduct of election officials. At the same time, a number of previously dismissed officials have returned.
It is unclear why no steps have been taken to create a national voter registry. Following the agreement to develop the registry in May, Yushchenko and Yanukovych agreed on the necessary legal and political steps. These were then approved by the Cabinet of Ministers, but since this approval. However, the Cabinet has neither funded nor implemented any of the measures necessary to create and confirm a national list.
Its failure to do so may not only affect the fairness of the vote on election day,
but could also provide a legal basis for political parties to sue for invalidation of
the vote. While invalidation is unlikely, the legal fight could continue for weeks or months, lengthening an already protracted political crisis.
After the election
The greatest danger to the country following the election, however, is not a legal challenge but a continuation of the current political deadlock.
Ukraine’s reputation has suffered severely around the world as the country has been unable to produce a stable, well-functioning legislative majority and government for over a year. Any mention of Ukraine’s “political crisis” to Western officials invariably produces, among other things, a rolling of the eyes and a sigh. This is not a welcome response for a country aspiring to join the western club.
Most polls conducted during July suggest that parties allied with President Yushchenko will gain almost equal votes to those allied with his rival Yanukovych. Those supporting Yushchenko will include former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko’s eponymous bloc and the president’s own Our Ukraine-People’s Self-Defense bloc. Yanukovych’s Party of Regions will likely find support from their current partner the Communist Party.
Jockeying will begin quickly in order to create a parliamentary majority coalition and choose a prime minister. The two sides will either remain in a stalemate as they are now, or they will adopt western standards for majority-minority parliamentary relations.
To meet these standards, the first step following the election should be a quick announcement of a majority coalition and prime minister nominee. This should be followed by a commitment from the coalition that the opposition will be provided oversight rights unprecedented in Ukraine – or in any country from the former Soviet space (excluding the Baltic states).
Should Yushchenko’s allies secure enough seats to form a majority coalition, the next steps should be straightforward. The Our Ukraine Bloc and The Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYUT) in February signed an extremely detailed agreement that includes a specific programme of action should they create a majority government. The document includes dozens of pieces of legislation, details specific guidelines for assigning portfolios, and grants the premiership to the party that polls highest.
All major parties also have already initialled the draft bill On Political Opposition and could introduce it immediately. There are signs, however, that Yushchenko and some of his supporters may not be prepared for a quick decision on a coalition. A very strong showing by the Party of Regions could lead to protracted negotiations similar to those following the 2006 elections. Then, Yushchenko and Our Ukraine negotiated with both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko for three months before finding itself unable to form a majority coalition with either.
Yushchenko himself has declined to state unequivocally which potential coalition he would support following the election. This hedging contrasts with very clear statements made by the leaders of his parliamentary bloc in support of an Our Ukraine-BYUT coalition, and could signal an upcoming internal party battle. Ukraine, however, has no more time for internal battles and indecision.
Western leaders will expect a new government to be put in place quickly. They will also expect it to be installed based on the results of an election that meets western standards. Most of all, they will be looking to President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yanukovych to make it happen.
