Ukrainian democracy remains very much in its infancy, and as such is still often mired by infantile behaviour. Throughout 2007 all the major parties have, to a greater or lesser extent, been guilty of this. Few will forget the increasingly hysterical tantrums of parliamentary speaker Oleksandr Moroz as he struggled to avoid the election campaign that he knew would end in his defeat, while earlier in the year members of Yulia Tymoshenko’s faction established a new low when they actually cut off electricity supplies to parliament building.
True to form, the new session of the country’s legislature had only been functioning for a matter of days before the Party of Regions initiated the first blockade of the session. This was followed by scenes of pandemonium when Yulia Tymoshenko failed by one vote to be elected prime minister. Her party claimed that there had been a technical error, while the opposition didn’t feel the need to engage in discussion and simply barged forward to form a scrum around the speaker’s chair.
All this certainly makes for entertaining viewing. The country’s political life has morphed in recent years into a bizarre but nevertheless world-beating hybrid of soap opera and reality TV series. However, there is only so much people can stomach and the general public will inevitably lose interest in 2008 if there is no improvement in parliamentary procedures. There is more than a hint of spoilt child syndrome in the behaviour of the country’s elected representatives and it is about time they grew up and acknowledged that physically blocking the podium is not a valid debating strategy. The public and the media can play a role in this process, simply by expressing their disgust for parties that continue to engage in bullying strategies or appear to favour spoiling tactics over reasoned discussion.
Parodies of people power
The low point of the year was undoubtedly the attempt in spring to artificially recreate the people power protests of 2004 by bussing in thousands of demonstrators from rural Ukraine. Whereas in 2004 millions had flocked to central Kyiv to protest against electoral fraud, the spring 2007 protests failed to gain any momentum and deteriorated into a poor parody of the people power ethos which had so memorably captured the world’s imagination during the Orange Revolution.
This cynical exercise in media manipulation exposed the failure of the ruling coalition to embrace even the most basic principles of the democratic process and served as a new, and hopefully final, nadir in the long-running practice of paying people to participate in political protests. Never before have so many people participated in political farce on such a scale and the end result was indifference among the wider population and confusion among the international community, which had difficulty in grasping the scale of the deceit involved.
Thankfully, there are signs that Ukraine may have finally moved on from such childish tactics. In the immediate aftermath of the September elections there were fears that a new round of protests would be staged to disrupt the coalition-building process, but after a single day of rallies in the capital complete with a bussed-in crowd marshalled by mega-phone-wielding country bumpkin commissars, the crowds evaporated and have not been seen in Kyiv since.
It is too early to claim that Ukrainian politics has finally grown out of its flag-waving, rent-a-mob phase, but at least we can say with confidence that the genre appears to have been overdone to the extent where it has patently lost its allure and ability to capture the headlines. Certainly in the wake of the debacle of spring 2007 the international media will certainly no longer be so easily fooled. With the option of importing thousands of demonstrators no longer so appealing, Ukraine’s political leaders may find themselves more inclined to seek out political solutions to the issues that continue to divide the country.
Varied institutional foundations
Throughout the manufactured crisis of spring 2007 the real heroes of the hour were Kyiv’s security services, who managed to maintain order and prevent bloodshed throughout almost two months of continual mass demonstrations, sometimes with rival parties holding rallies just yards apart from one another. While politicians from the governing coalition recklessly talked of impending civil war, the police men and women of the Ukrainian capital did a marvelous job of keeping the peace. Their professionalism and calm handling of a potentially explosive situation was world class, and bodes well for the future management of the large crowds we can expect for Euro 2012.
Ukraine’s police force has been much maligned over the years for its perceived corruption, but throughout the months of the spring crisis it displayed levels professionalism that few would previously have credited it with. A country is the sum total of its institutions and the Ukrainian police force emerged from the doldrums in 2007 with a performance that allowed the country to avert potential disaster.
The same cannot be said for Ukraine’s law courts, which experienced a varied year and were once again exposed as the playthings of political interests. The judiciary is currently Ukraine’s weakest constitutional link, and the attitude of the new government towards reforming the country’s law courts will be indicative of its broader commitment to transparency and the rule of law.
Yulia v Yushchenko
The year began with all eyes on the much-hyped battle of the two Viktors, with President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yanukovych locked in a very public power struggle for control of the country. It has ended with Yushchenko engaged in a curiously disjointed cold war against his Orange Revolution ally Yulia Tymoshenko. The two are regarded as rivals for the 2009 presidency and Tymoshenko’s huge gains in the September 30 vote effectively place her in pole position for the country’s top job.
Two years after he fired her from the post of prime minister, Yushchenko has found himself playing second fiddle to the charismatic Tymoshenko. This reversal of fortunes has resulted in all manner of political jockeying behind the scenes. Yushchenko has once more flirted publicly with the idea of a broad coalition bringing together Our Ukraine and Party of Regions deputies, and only belatedly conceded support for a Tymoshenko-led government.
This simmering Orange civil war poses a present and direct threat to Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions. With a slim two-seat margin in the new parliament, there is little chance of much needed reform legislation being carried through with unprecedented unity in government. In short, the only hope for a successful Orange coalition lies in the ability of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko to work together. Failure to do so would undermine the country’s fledgling democratic traditions and encourage the voting public to consider other political models.
The borderland of democracy
Ukraine enters 2008 well on the way to establishing itself as the eastern bulwark of European democratic traditions. The democracy-building processes at work in the country are by no means easy on the eye, but a quick glance at the authoritarian methods employed elsewhere in the former Soviet empire will suffice to highlight the scale of the progress made in Ukraine.
The days when the former Soviet republics could be regarded as part of a single, indivisible political culture are now long gone, and the differences in the political models adopted by Ukraine and Russia over the past three years look set to become more pronounced in 2008. In the next few months we can expect to see Putin anointed as Russia’s de facto national leader for life, while in March we shall witness the spectacle of yet another stage-managed election to install a puppet president who can be trusted to do Putin’s bidding. Only when viewed against such a backdrop of totalitarian tendencies can the limited gains of today’s Ukrainian democracy been truly appreciated.
Whatever happens next in Kyiv, it is hard to imagine a return to the dreary days of vertical power structures, press censorship and state-sanctioned vote-rigging. Will 2008 be the year in which the EU belatedly acknowledges this transition away from the old authoritarian ways of the Soviet era? Ukraine’s progress over the past three years would certainly seem to merit something a little more emphatic than the lukewarm signals it regularly receives from Brussels. Problems closer to home will be more than enough to occupy the government in the coming year, but nevertheless if the Orange coalition can form a functioning majority and Russia’s slide into authoritarianism continues, then 2008 could see the start of a new stage in Ukraine’s European integration.
