During last September’s election campaign Yulia Tymoshenko repeatedly stressed that her 2005 period in office had been undermined by a parliament she couldn’t control and a cabinet she didn’t appoint. This time, she promised, it would be different. With a parliamentary majority behind her and a cabinet appointed jointly with her Orange ally Yushchenko, this was to be a reformist administration with the institutional clout to match the lofty ambitions of Maidan.
Reloading the revolution
Within a month of coming into office the Tymoshenko government has already made itself felt both at home and abroad. Instead of another revolution, we have experienced something akin to a palace coup, but the results are none the less tangible. Ukraine is now the verge of WTO membership, preparing to negotiate a far-reaching new free trade partnership deal with the EU and re-entering into membership discussions with NATO. Soviet bank collapse debts are being slowly repaid and social payments increased; ambitious privatisation plans have been put forward and international finance courted.
The timing of the recent Schengen zone extension, which came into force literally days after she took office, has admittedly been convenient for Tymoshenko. With Ukraine now serving as the major eastern border and bottleneck for the EU, closer ties between the two partners have become a pressing concern. Nevertheless the speedy progress made in trade talks with the EU which led to the WTO breakthrough is evidence of a new warmth from Brussels and suggests that the Yulia factor was significant.
Coming after long months of political stalemate, this burst of governmental direction was bound to create the impression that somebody was finally in charge. Tymoshenko would logically appear to be that person. In a country where strong leadership is lionised and the rudderless confusion of the past few years often compared unfavourably with the authoritarian order of neighbouring regimes, such perceived leadership qualities are only likely to boost Tymoshenko’s electoral standing and strengthen her position further.
Secure on the throne
There remains an overriding impression that few people have yet to appreciate the fundamental strength of Tymoshenko’s current position. Much has been said about the wafer-thin nature of her parliamentary majority and the possibility of a new rift with the President, but it remains unclear how she could possibly be removed from power. Yushchenko forfeited his right to remove heads of governments with his 2004 constitutional compromise, and could only now hope to issue a new call for fresh elections. He is, however, extremely unlikely to follow such a suicidal path and run the risk of consolidating Tymoshenko’s already dominant position, while any mass desertion of Our Ukraine deputies within the existing parliament would likely lead to eventual electoral meltdown for the party. Indeed, few Ukrainian politicians would currently relish facing Tymoshenko in an election campaign and as the months clock up she is only likely to grow in stature.
Yushchenko now finds himself in a tight spot. When dealing with Yanukovych, the President always felt that he could ultimately call on the support of the majority of voters. That is clearly not the case with Tymoshenko. And yet he remains obliged to rely on her support if he is to succeed in strengthening the presidency and must hope she will decide to stick with him in 2009. Nor will it have escaped his attention that any backing for a stronger presidency from Tymoshenko may well come with a view to later taking the job herself. Tymoshenko, meanwhile, can approach negotiations safe in the knowledge that she could, if required, win any national vote. There is little doubt that if Yulia were to decide to run for the presidency in 2009, she would be immediately regarded as a hot favourite for the post.
Preparing for a long reign
If Tymoshenko was to win the presidency that would mean five years as head of state, with a possible further five to follow. If we add the two years between now and the presidential elections to this total, Tymoshenko could conceivably be looking at 12 years in power. Speculation of this nature is admittedly fraught with difficulties, but while the idea that the country has already entered a new, Yulian Age may seem a little far fetched or premature to readers, you can be sure the thought has already occurred to Tymoshenko herself, and to a great many of her allies.
