An unseemly squabble within the governing coalition is currently hampering efforts to select a single Orange candidate for the forthcoming Kyiv Mayoral elections (see page 26 for report). This lack of co-operation has come as no surprise to anyone who is even vaguely familiar with the goings-on in Ukrainian politics. Rather than representing an ideological split, these divisions within the Orange camp are symptomatic of a well-documented national malaise which seems to prevent Ukraine’s reformist leaders from ever presenting a united front in any but the most desperate of situations. While in opposition, the country’s Orange reformers are always ready to sign pacts and engage in talk of their historic mission, but once in government the appeal of power and the greed of individual politicians appear to take priority over broader national interests and ideological concerns, leaving the voters whose support propelled these self-styled saviours into office feeling cheated by their elected representatives and disillusioned with the democratic process in general.
Self-inflicted wounds
Former boxing hero Vitaliy Klitschko would appear to be the obvious choice to represent the governing coalition in the fight to be Kyiv’s next mayor, but Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko seems to be currently toying with the idea of supporting her own, 100% loyalist candidate. Meanwhile, numerous other figures within the Orange coalition are also busy preparing campaigns and putting forward their candidacies while declaring that parliamentary affiliations count for nothing in the race for city hall.
The end result will in all probability be a complete Balkanisation of the Orange vote and a default victory for incumbent Leonid Chernovetskiy, the man whose erratic behaviour sparked the whole pre-term election push in the first place. In other words, the democratic coalition looks to be moving slowly but surely towards yet another self-inflicted and damaging defeat.
Ideological allies, Orange enemies
We have seen this pattern repeat itself again and again in recent years, most famously in the manner in which the opposition to the old Kuchma regime united around Viktor Yushchenko before and during the Orange Revolution, only to then splinter off into competing cliques within months of taking office in 2005. This was followed by the great betrayal by Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz in 2006, who managed to single-handedly scuttle plans for a renewed Orange coalition by defecting to the Party of Regions at the eleventh hour.
The principal players involved in these debacles appear to be singularly incapable of learning from earlier mistakes. Such is the current bitterness between the ideological bedfellows of the Orange Revolution that President Yushchenko is now thought to favour a pragmatic union with elements of the Party of Regions over and above a truce with his erstwhile allies. Yushchenko was forced to temporarily reject this political brinkmanship when his friends in the Party of Regions openly sought to undermine his presidency in early 2007, forcing him to disband parliament and call new elections in which he lined up alongside his erstwhile Orange allies. However, within three days of the September 2007 vote Yushchenko sought to divide the Orange coalition once more, calling on all parties to work together and hinting at a new power-sharing arrangement in which everything would depend on him.
Two Ukrainians, three Hetmans
This is all painfully reminiscent of the old joke about two Ukrainians and three Hetmans. Indeed, there is rarely an episode in Ukraine’s troubled history of foreign oppression which was not shaped in some way by in-fighting and betrayal among the country’s leaders. Whether we’re talking about the fratricide so common among the princely brothers of the Kyiv Rus or the double-dealing of the Cossack leaders, this tendency towards utter disunity runs through Ukrainian history like a particularly debilitating hereditary defect (see page 32 for more). This has arguably been the key factor serving to undermine repeated attempts to build an independent Ukrainian state over the past few centuries.
If Ukraine were a mature democracy with venerable old institutions and a high standard of living, all this political bickering within the country’s reformist camp might be a little more excusable. Coming as it does amid a period of national reformation, with the country struggling to free itself from the Russian orbit and join the European family of nations, it is nothing short of disgraceful.
Ultimately, the future direction of the country may well hinge on the ability of the Orange parties to put their differences aside for long enough to govern effectively. Unfortunately past experience suggests that this might prove too much of a challenge.
