As Vladimir Putin leaves office and prepares for his new role as prime minister and puppet master general of the Russian state, it is increasingly evident that the greatest single foreign policy failure of his presidency has been the loss of Ukraine. Three and a half years since the Orange Revolution, relations between the two Slavic nations have plummeted to a record low. Ukraine stands poised to strengthen ties with the EU and is seeking to begin the process towards NATO membership. A territory most Russians had long since taken for granted has been snatched away from them, and they are now facing the unthinkable prospect of a hostile front on their southern flank. Putin must take personal responsibility for this debacle. It was his direct intervention in the Ukrainian presidential elections of 2004 which did so much to spark the anti-government sentiment that propelled the Orange Revolution and led to a rupturing of Moscow’s age-old paternal influence. His hubris may even have prevented a de facto return to empire.
Moment of truth for imperial ambitions
It seems inconceivable now that a Russian president could think it advisable to visit Kyiv on the eve of a presidential election and appear live on Ukrainian TV to campaign for his choice. To understand how such a thing could have happened, it helps to bear in mind that in late 2004 Ukraine appeared to be ripe for the plucking. Moscow was putting the finishing touches to plans for a customs union which would have reunited the former Soviet republics into a bloc to rival the EU, but before these ambitions could be realised Putin had to secure the succession in Ukraine. The country was favourably positioned; increasingly isolated internationally and rooted in a corrupted political culture which seemed to bind it eternally to the Russian world. Far from being restive, the general population seemed apolitical and apathetic. Government officials boasted that this apathy would prevent any disorder along the lines of Georgia’s hotheaded Rose Revolution. Even so, Putin must have known that it was risky to personally meddle in Ukraine. His fateful decision to come to Kyiv was both an indication of just how high the stakes were and a reflection of the difficulties Russia has had weaning itself away from the mentality of empire. The rest, as they say, is history, and we are now entering a period which will likely see bilateral relations deteriorate still further. The appearance of President Medvedev is unlikely to improve matters. Not only is he widely expected to be president in name only, but it is also worth remembering that the smiling, presentable, rock n’ roll loving Medvedev was one of the masterminds behind Russia’s calamitous Ukrainian policy of 2004.
A very different Ukraine
To fully appreciate the scale of Russia’s setback in Ukraine it is worth speculating over how things might have turned out if the Orange Revolution had never happened and Yanukovych had become president. What sort of country would we be living in today? In this parallel universe President Yanukovych has been ruling Ukraine for over three years. There is no political opposition to speak of in this parallel Ukraine, just radical pan-Slavic nationalists calling for official union with Russia and communists demanding the return of the Soviet Union. These groups allow Yanukovych to appear moderate as he binds the country ever tighter to Russia’s belt. In 2005 Ukraine signed up to membership of the Eurasian Economic Union, and this grouping is increasingly dominating political affairs. Ukrainian nationalist parties, meanwhile, have been implicated in a series of terror plots and are largely marginalised. The brief, post-independence rehabilitation of Ukrainian historical heroes has been swiftly reversed.
Last week President Yanukovych was preparing to fly to Moscow in order to do homage at the inauguration of President Putin for a third term as ruler of Russia and chairman of the Eurasian Economic Union. Yanukovych was in good cheer, safe in the knowledge that he would be lavishly praised in Putin’s address. Although universally shunned and condemned throughout the democratic world, President Yanukovych can always expect a big show of support from Putin. He is, after all, a trusted vassal who provided the springboard for Russia’s new imperial adventure. The state-controlled media reports all of this dutifully, ad nauseam. TV broadcasts are now almost exclusively in Russian and beamed direct from Moscow to homes across the EEU. Big budget cabaret spectaculars featuring all the megastars of empire dominate the airwaves, and the few Ukrainian language channels that continue to broadcast are heavily censored and isolated. State business is conducted in Russian. Nobody talks about the Holodomor or UPA anymore, while the West is portrayed as being implicitly hostile. Relations with the EU have collapsed. Sanctions and counter sanctions have reduced trade between the two economic blocs to a trickle, but Russian petro-dollars keep the Ukrainian economy afloat. For security reasons, the Kremlin has taken direct control of Ukraine’s transit pipeline network, and has reduced the country to a state of perpetual dependency on cheap energy supplies. In this parallel Ukraine, there is no more talk of reform, only of stability.
Can the West match Russia’s resolve?
All this might seem a little bit far-fetched, but back in October 2004 it was frighteningly realistic. The bilateral dynamic has altered so much in the meantime that such nightmare scenarios now seem almost ridiculous, but nevertheless there is little to suggest that Putin and Co. have reconciled themselves to the loss of Ukraine. The Orange parties may have committed the country to an independent path, but there is ample evidence that Russia still doesn’t acknowledge Kyiv’s right to such presumption. In simple terms, unless Putin can somehow reverse Ukraine’s march towards Euro-Atlantic integration his political legacy will be fatally flawed. Europe urgently needs to appreciate this simple fact if it wishes to comprehend Russia’s current stance. A general consensus already exists among analysts that Russia without Ukraine cannot hope to be a great power, and so we should not be surprised if the Kremlin grows more openly belligerent in the coming months. The real question is whether the West can collectively match this Russian resolve.
