Accepted wisdom has it that the current elections will merely produce the same results as the 2006 round of voting, leaving the political status quo intact. This assumption fails to take into account the fact that until the Moroz defection, the 2006 vote was an almost exact ideological repeat of the 2004 presidential results. Opinion polls suggest that this pattern will indeed be repeated, meaning that we could soon witness the return to power of a renewed orange coalition, with Yulia Tymoshenko no longer a junior partner this time round but instead very much in the driving seat.
Assault on fortress Donbass
In a bid to cement her ascendancy, the Tymoshenko campaign strategy has focused on a bold offensive into the Party of Regions bastions of southern and eastern Ukraine.
If she succeeds in winning over a significant proportion of disgruntled Regions voters and alienated former Socialist Party devotees, Tymoshenko will have achieved what no other politician among the current crop has succeeded in doing, namely bridging the regional schism which hampers the country’s progress. This would represent an unprecedented mandate from the Ukrainian electorate.
The rise and rise of Ms. Tymoshenko
There would be a certain sense of continuity if the Tymoshenko Bloc’s drive to claim a chunk of the Yanukovych vote proves decisive. After all, Tymoshenko has been at the epicentre of all the country’s major political earthquakes of the past three years. If we look back and ask why the first orange government fell apart in 2005, the shorthand answer is simple enough: because of Tymoshenko. Rivalries and jealousies provoked by her attempts at strong government were at the core of the Orange collapse.
Why did attempts to form a renewed Orange coalition unravel after the 2006 parliamentary elections? Again, it was all down to clashes over Tymoshenko, whose stated desire to return to the Prime Minister’s office was so bitterly opposed by her Orange allies that it paved the way for a Yanukovych comeback.
The Yulia factor was also the driving force pushing President Yushchenko to dissolve parliament in April. His decree was in many ways an overt admission that whatever his personal reservations may have been, playing second fiddle to Yulia had, by spring 2007, become a political necessity in order to stave off the present danger of becoming a lame duck president.
For her part, Tymoshenko has never been as low profile as she was throughout the political crisis that followed, a sure enough indication that she had gotten what she wanted and was content to let the boys squabble it out among themselves.
Yushchenko as kingmaker
Barring a major surprise at the polls the only potential obstacle now blocking Tymoshenko’s path to the premier’s office would come in the shape of post-election efforts by President Yushchenko to revive his discredited collaboration with a returning Yanukovych government.
At first glance it might appear unthinkable that Yushchenko could consider working with a team which has relentlessly attacked his presidential powers since coming back to office and failed to keep faith with any of the policy commitments made in the notorious Universal Agreement on National Unity struck in August 2006.
Given Yushchenko’s taste for the middle ground and fear of Tymoshenko’s popular appeal, such compromises can never be ruled out. However, the only conceivable argument for such a compromising coalition would be one of national consolidation. Crucially, Tymoshenko can now effectively render that position redundant by securing a foothold in the South and East of the country.
If her bid to capture Donbass hearts and minds fails, then Yushchenko will be strengthened in his position as kingmaker, with the end result that we could be in for a new round of prolonged coalition talks. If Yulia succeeds in the East, however, it should prove decisive and force Yushchenko to accept as Prime Minister the lady who may well be his closest rival for the 2009 presidency.
